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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-2987 
___________ 
 
RONALD SEATON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN FORT DIX FCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. No. 1-14-cv-02331) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 26, 2015 
 
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges  
 
(Filed: March 19, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Ronald Seaton appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his petition filed 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for lack of jurisdiction.  For the reasons below, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order. 
 In 2004 Seaton was convicted of drug trafficking and firearms charges by a jury in 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  Because he had two prior 
felony drug convictions, he was sentenced as a Career Criminal Offender to 240 months 
in prison after the District Court departed downward by 82 months from the bottom of 
Seaton’s guidelines range.  We affirmed his conviction and sentence on appeal.  See 
United States v. Seaton, 178 F. App’x 172 (3d Cir. 2006).  Seaton filed a motion pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 which the District Court denied on the merits.   
 In July 2009, Seaton filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in which he 
argued that he was wrongly sentenced as a career criminal offender.  The District Court 
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, and we affirmed.  See Seaton v. Schultz, 
359 F. App’x 271 (3d Cir. 2009).  In April 2014, Seaton filed the instant § 2241 petition 
in which he again challenges his sentence as a career criminal offender.  The District 
Court dismissed the petition for a lack of jurisdiction, and Seaton filed a notice of appeal. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s legal conclusions.  Cradle v. United States, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  Under the explicit terms of § 2255, a § 2241 petition cannot be entertained by 
a court unless a § 2255 motion would be “inadequate or ineffective.”  Cradle, 290 F.3d at 
538.  We have explained:  
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A § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective only where the petitioner 
demonstrates that some limitation of scope or procedure would prevent a 
§ 2255 proceeding from affording him a full hearing and adjudication of his 
wrongful detention claim.  It is the inefficacy of the remedy, not the 
personal inability to use it, that is determinative.  Section 2255 is not 
inadequate or ineffective merely because the sentencing court does not 
grant relief, the one year statute of limitations has expired, or the petitioner 
is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of the amended 
§ 2255.  
   
Id. at 538-39 (citations omitted).  Seaton has not shown that a § 2255 motion would be 
inadequate or ineffective.  He argues that our decision in In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 
(3d Cir. 1997), allows him to proceed via § 2241 because he did not have an earlier 
opportunity to raise this claim.  In Dorsainvil, we held that a defendant may proceed via 
§ 2241 when a subsequent statutory interpretation renders the defendant’s conduct no 
longer criminal.  Id. at 251.  Here, Seaton is challenging his designation as a career 
offender.  Thus, he does not fall within the exception created in Dorsainvil and he may 
not proceed under § 2241.  See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120–21 (3d Cir. 
2002) (petitioner barred from proceeding under § 2241 because his argument related to 
sentencing rather than the criminality of his conduct). 
 While we do not reach the merits of Seaton’s claims, it appears that he is mistaken 
about his prior conviction.  Seaton argues that his 1997 conviction was for simple 
possession of a controlled substance in violation of 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(16) 
and should not have been used as a predicate offense for his Career Criminal Offender 
status.  He contends that the sentencing court “employed the hypothetical approach” and 
turned his conviction for possession of controlled substance into a conviction for 
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violating 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(30), which prohibits in relevant part “the 
manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled 
substance.”  However, according to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas 
electronic docket available online, Seaton pleaded guilty in February 1997 to violating 
subsection (a)(30).  Seaton does not dispute that his earlier, 1994 conviction for violating 
subsection (a)(30) qualifies as a predicate offense.  To the extent that the online docket is 
correct, Seaton’s claims are without merit. 
 Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the 
appeal.  See Third Circuit LAR 27.4.  For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by 
the District Court, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See Third Circuit 
I.O.P. 10.6.  
